Two at the Top: Quality Differentiation in Markets with Switching Costs by Gehrig, Thomas & Stenbacka, Rune
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassflas 
ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff  
 
Discussion Papers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two at the Top: Quality Differentiation in Markets 
with Switching Costs 
 
 
 
Thomas Gehrig 
University of Freiburg, and CEPR 
 
 
and 
 
Rune Stenbacka 
Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, and RUESG, 
University of Helsinki, and HECER 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 55 
March 2005 
 
ISSN 1795-0562 
 
  
 
 
 
 
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-00014 
University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-191-28781,  
E-mail info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi 
   
HECER 
Discussion Paper No. 55  
 
Two at the Top: Quality Differentiation in Markets 
with Switching Costs* 
 
Abstract 
 
We explore the effects of switching costs on the subgame perfect quality decisions of 
oligopolists with repeated price competition. We establish a strong strategic quality 
premium. We show that competition for the establishment of customer relationships will 
eliminate low-quality firms in period 1 and that low-quality firms can survive only based on 
poaching profits. The equilibrium configuration is characterized by an agglomeration of two 
providers of top-quality as soon as switching cost heterogeneity is sufficiently significant. 
We demonstrate a finiteness property, according to which the two top-quality firms 
dominate the market with a joint market share exceeding 50 %.     
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1. Introduction 
In existing models of vertical product differentiation firms typically relax price competition by 
choosing different levels of quality (Shaked and Sutton, 1982).  Nevertheless in many industries 
it appears that several competing firms simultaneously supply products located at the highest 
available level of the quality spectrum. The rating industry is dominated by the rivals Standard & 
Poors and Moodys. The auction houses Sotheby’s and Christie’s are the dominant auction houses 
for art auctions and these rivals exhibit a roughly similar economic performance. The aircraft 
industry is characterized by fairly symmetric duopoly competition between Airbus and Boeing 
and it is indeed hard to find evidence of systematic quality differences between their products. In 
these examples, rivalry between the two leading firms is intense, but yet no single firm seems to 
clearly dominate its rival(s) in terms of quality. Similarly, in the micro-processor industry each 
generation of microprocessors is clearly dominated by two firms, Intel and AMD (American 
Microprocessor Devices). Finally, the United States General Accounting Office’s report to a 
Senate committee (2003) documents in great detail that the accounting and audit services industry 
has a structure with two dominant accounting firms when the client firms are classified according 
to their industrial sector. In fact, for a spectrum of different investigated industrial sectors the two 
dominant accounting firms have a joint market share in the range between 70 % and 95 %. 
These observations are at striking variance with the predictions of the existing literature 
on vertical product differentiation. Virtually all the existing models of vertical product 
differentiation, where firms offer quality-differentiated products, have the property that only one 
firm provides the highest quality product, and all other firms offer products representing 
distinctly lower qualities. In these models the top-quality firm typically enjoys the highest mark-
up, market share and profit.1 None of these models generates market structures where there could 
be any agglomeration of competitors offering similar (or even identical) vertical characteristics.  
On a more general level, the idea of firms offering identical commodities and competing 
in prices has virtually no theoretical basis in industrial economics. In equilibrium firms will 
typically offer differentiated, and hence different products.  
In this paper we argue that the traditional vertical differentiation literature has neglected 
switching costs as a crucial characteristic of those industries, where quality competition is an 
important dimension. If an airline demands an extra set of jets of a given size class, it might have 
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strong incentives to stay with the incumbent provider in order to economize on the cost of 
training new crews and mechanics as well as spare parts and maintenance. In other words, 
switching the aircraft may be quite expensive for an airline. Likewise accountants familiar with a 
company from previous encounters will cause less of a burden to management time than a new 
accounting team. Again, switching accountants imposes potentially significant switching costs on 
management.  
In the presence of switching costs, incumbents have an interest to exploit their monopoly 
power on those captive clients with an established customer relationship. On the other hand, the 
very same firm may aggressively poach for new customers, currently loyal to a rival. Hence, 
switching cost also invite price discrimination between attached and unattached consumers.  
 In this study we show that switching costs and the possibility to price discriminate 
generate systematic and interesting interactions with product choice. In particular, switching costs 
will help to segment the market. Hence, even in a duopoly two high-quality firms are able to 
share the market and still earn positive profits in the presence of switching costs. While intense ex 
ante price competition reduces any advantages to incumbency, competition for poaching revenues 
is limited when the top quality is offered by only two firms. 
We focus on vertically differentiated markets where switching cost heterogeneity 
dominates relative to income heterogeneity. We prove that low-quality producers have a 
particularly strong incentive to close the quality gap to high-quality producers despite the bite of 
price competition. Under such circumstances the equilibrium configuration will be characterized 
by an agglomeration of two firms at the top of the quality spectrum. In this sense our result differs 
strongly from standard vertical differentiation models, where the degree of differentiation is 
always strictly positive and no two firms would offer identical qualities. In our model the 
incentives created by poaching profits dominate relative to the competition-relaxing effects of 
quality differentiation. This holds true as long as the poaching profits survive, i.e. as long as no 
more than two firms produce the top quality. However, our results do not invalidate the property 
of a natural oligopoly found in earlier models of vertical product differentiation (for example, 
Shaked and Sutton (1982) and (1983)), since entry is limited by the profitability of poaching 
revenues. In particular, our theory predicts that there will never be more than two firms at the top 
of the quality spectrum. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
1  See,  for example,  Shaked and Sutton (1982), (1983) or Gehrig (1996). 
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Our analysis is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of consumers 
with switching costs. Sections 3 and 4 analyze price and quality competition for duopolistic 
industries where the consumers have a fixed income level. Section 5 generalizes the duopoly 
result to the case of simultaneous income and switching cost heterogeneity. Section 6 explores 
some implications of our theory for industrial structure and welfare. Finally, Section 7 offers 
concluding comments. 
 
2. A Model of Quality Choice with Switching Costs 
 
We consider a market with repeat purchases of non-durable commodities or services in two 
periods. In this respect our model can be seen as a dynamic extension of Shaked and Sutton 
(1982). The commodities can be offered at different quality levels [ ]ωυ ,∈q , where )(υω  
denotes the highest (lowest) available quality ( 0>υ ). 
Consumers value quality. However, they trade off quality against the value of their 
residual commodity basket, which we simply measure by the income y available for this 
composite commodity. Their preferences in a given period are represented as 
2,1,),( == tyqyqU ttttt  .   (1) 
Aggregate inter-temporal utility is separable across time periods. Future consumption is 
discounted at the rate 10 ≤< δ  according to  
( ) ( ) ( )2221112211 ,,,,, yqUyqUyqyqU δ+= .  (2) 
 Consumers are assumed to face consumer-specific switching costs. Following Chen 
(1997) we assume that the switching costs s of a consumer with income y are uniformly 
distributed on [ ]s,0  with ys < .  The parameter s  captures the magnitude of the switching cost 
differentiation and the switching costs are assumed to be lower than the income under all 
circumstances. 
The switching costs s can be justified by, for example an inspection cost, which has to be 
paid each time a new product is acquired. This inspection cost may, for example, capture a 
learning cost, e.g. the opportunity cost of getting acquainted with a new piece of software or a 
new operating system. As another example, the switching cost could capture the initial x-ray a 
dentist typically takes before starting any operation. It has to be paid each time another dentist is 
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selected. Likewise a tax consultant needs to be familiarized with the personal income situation for 
each new customer.  
We initially assume that income is fixed at yyt =  in order to highlight a configuration 
where switching cost heterogeneity dominates completely relative to income heterogeneity. This 
assumption is at variance with Shaked and Sutton (1982), who require positive income dispersion 
in order to allow for entry of more than one firm. Since in our framework entry is possibly even 
in the absence of income heterogeneity, we concentrate on the simpler case with fixed income.2 
Furthermore, this case allows us to separate the effects of switching cost differentiation from the 
implications of heterogeneity in income. For simplicity assume that production takes place at 
constant and identical marginal costs normalized to zero.3   
 The timing of decisions is as follows: With an established industry structure firms select 
product quality. Then for given and mutually observed qualities the competing firms determine 
prices in several two rounds of competition. In the second round of price competition we allow 
for history dependent pricing. In particular, firms can discriminate between its own customers and 
those consumers with an established customer relationship with a rival. Thus firms are allowed to 
poach the rivals’ customers, while they typically treat their loyal customers differently.  Prices to 
loyal customers are denoted by ip1  and 
ip2 , while poaching prices in period 2 are denoted by 
ir  
for firms i=H,L.  
For most of the sequel we are interested in the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria of 
this three-stage game. Section 3 analyses the price equilibrium in periods 1 and 2 before section 4 
presents the analysis of the quality choice. In section 5 we generalize our model to 
simultaneously capture income and switching cost heterogeneity. 
 
3. Price Competition with Fixed Qualities 
In this section we analyze price competition for fixed quality choices. Further, we assume that the 
consumers are all endowed with the same income, y. We will here analyze the case of duopoly 
and subsequently discuss the general case with more than 2 firms in Section 6. Let HL qq ≤ .4  
 
                                                          
2  We demonstrate in Section 5 that our main results carry over to the more complex case with income heterogeneity. 
3  While the assumption of identical costs for commodities of different qualities may not seem realistic, Shaked and 
Sutton (1982) show that even under this extreme assumption firms may still strategically select the production of 
different qualities in order to relax price competition. 
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a) Duopolistic Price Competition in Period 2  
 
 In period 2 firms can price discriminate on the basis of customer purchase histories. Firms 
want to charge particularly attractive prices to rivals’ customers in order to poach them away 
from their competitors, while at the same time exploit locked-in customers up to the limit 
determined by the customer-specific switching cost. However, the poaching prices of rivals pose 
a competitive threat to the exploitation of locked-in customers and for that reason incumbent 
firms may have to charge low enough prices to loyal customers in order to prevent those from 
being successfully poached by competitors.  
 Poaching will induce switching only if the poaching offers undercut incumbent prices by 
more than the switching cost. A former buyer of the high-quality product ( Hq ) will switch to a 
low-quality product ( Lq ) if and only if
5 
   ( ) ( )sryqpyq HLHH −−<− 2      (3a) 
and a former buyer of a low-quality product will switch if and only if  
   ( ) ( )sryqpyq LHLL −−<− 2 .     (3b) 
Consequently, switching will occur especially for consumers with low switching costs, whereas 
consumers with higher switching costs tend to be more loyal. 
Let LH qq −=∆ . Then the critical level of switching costs, below which the customer 
finds it optimal to switch to the competitor, is given by 
   ( )yrqpq
q
s HL
H
H
L
H ∆−−= 21ˆ      (4a) 
for former customers of the high-quality product, whereas the critical switching costs is 
   ( )yrqpq
q
s LH
L
L
H
L ∆+−= 21ˆ      (4b) 
for customers belonging to the inherited market share of the low-quality firm. 
 Let us consider price competition in period 2 for formerly high quality consumers first. 
Both the incumbent and the poaching firm maximize expected profits given by  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
4  At this stage it does not matter which firm, 1 or 2, provides the higher quality. We also consider identical qualities. 
5 We have introduced switching costs in a multiplicative way so as to keep the model as close to Shaked and Sutton 
(1982). This specification has also been used by, for example, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), (1980). Strictly 
speaking this imposes the structure that the effective switching costs increase with the quality of the product one 
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  ( )HHp sspH ˆmax 22 −  ,     (5a) 
 
  H
H
r srH ˆmax  ,      (5b) 
 
respectively. Likewise the objective functions in the market segment of former customers of the 
low-quality firm read as: 
   L
L
r srL ˆmax       (6a) 
  ( )LLp sspL ˆmax 22 −  .     (6b) 
 Due to price discrimination the period-2 market is separated into segments of former 
buyers of the high-quality product and former buyers of the low-quality product. Competition for 
former buyers of the high-quality product involves the high-quality incumbent and the low-
quality poacher, while competition for the former buyers of the low-quality product involves the 
low-quality incumbent and the high-quality poacher.  
Standard analysis generates equilibrium prices and the corresponding profits from 
incumbency and from poaching. 
 
Proposition 3.1 (Period-2 Prices): When y
q
qqs
L
LH −≥   equilibrium prices in period 2 are: 




+−−
+−=



))((
)2)((
3
12
sqyqqq
sqyqqq
qqr
p
LLHH
LLHL
LH
H
H
   (7a) 




+−−
+−=



)2)((
))((
3
1
2 sqyqqq
sqyqqq
qqp
r
HLHH
HLHL
LH
L
L
 .  (7b) 
 
 
Proof:  The first order conditions of the quadratic objective functions (5a) and (5b.) read 




∆−
+∆




−
−=


 −
y
sqy
rq
pq L
H
L
H
H
1
2
21
12
 .   (8a) 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
switches to. However, this is not a critical assumption from the point of view of our qualitative results and an earlier 
version of this paper has focused on switching costs, which enter in an additive way.  
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Moreover the first order conditions of (6a) and (6b) read 




∆
+∆−




−
−=


 −
y
sqy
pq
rq H
L
L
L
H
1
2 21
12
 .   (8b) 
Straightforward calculations yield the statements of Proposition 3.1.  
 
The inequality 

 

 −−≥ y
q
qy
q
qs
H
L
L
H 1
2
1,)1(max  states a sufficient condition for 
interior solutions with feasible poaching and incumbency prices. Hence y
q
qqs
L
LH −≥  is 
required for an interior optimum. 
        Q.E.D. 
  
From (7a) and (7b) we can see that more dispersed switching costs unambiguously lead to 
higher period-2 prices. This captures the intuitive idea that a higher switching cost threshold 
makes it possible for firms to exploit locked-in customers to a higher extent. In addition, higher 
switching costs increase the returns from poaching leading to a higher poaching price in 
equilibrium. Overall, a more concentrated distribution of switching costs (lower s ) intensifies 
period-2 competition and leads to lower equilibrium prices 
The condition y
q
qqs
L
LH −≥  turns out to be a sufficient condition for switching to 
emerge in equilibrium. In fact, if y
q
qqs
L
LH −<  the L-firm does not engage in poaching, i.e. 
0=Hr , whereas it charges marginal cost prices 02 =Lp  to customers belonging to its own market 
segment if  y
q
qs
H
L )
22
1( −<  .  
Naturally, in equilibrium the poaching price is always lower than the incumbency price. 
Incumbents want to exploit the switching costs of their locked-in customers, while poaching the 
rival’s customers at the same time. Active poaching and equilibrium customer switching from 
high to low quality take place, whenever the heterogeneity in switching costs is sufficiently large, 
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i.e. when y
q
qqs
L
LH −≥  . Otherwise, when this condition does not hold, poaching by the low-
quality producer does not take place and the high-quality producer selects prices that just deter 
poaching from the low-quality producer. Furthermore, the high-quality producer always engages 
in poaching, and there will always be a positive measure of consumers switching from the low 
quality to the high quality producer – but not vice versa.  
 
Proposition 3.2:  When y
q
qqs
L
LH −≥  poaching and equilibrium switching take place. 
Customers belonging to firm H’s market segment switch if 

 −−=<
L
LH
H q
yqqsss )(
3
1ˆ , 
while customers belonging to firm L’s market segment switch if 


 −+=<
L
LH
L q
yqqsss )(
3
1ˆ . In particular, we can conclude that HL ss ˆˆ > . 
 
Proof: Straightforward and omitted. 
 
 Proposition 3.2 captures the idea that the lock-in effects of business relationships are 
quality-contingent within the framework of models with vertical differentiation. In particular, 
Proposition 3.2 means that the switching cost threshold required to prevent a customer of a low-
quality firm from switching is higher than the threshold required to keep a customer of a high-
quality firm loyal. Thus, high-quality producers tend to have more loyal customers. In this 
respect, the production of a high-quality product is associated with a strategic premium as it is 
structurally more resistant to switching compared with a low-quality product. 6 
We next calculate the profits associated with the equilibrium prices. These profits are 
reported in 
 
Proposition 3.3 (Period-2 Profits)  Expected profits from incumbency are 
( )22 2)(9
1)( sqyqq
qq
H LLH
HL
+−=Π   for the high-quality firm,    (9a) 
                                                          
6 This seems to be consistent with observations from, for example, the car industry, where high-quality brands 
typically have a higher degree of customer loyalty.  
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( )22 2)(9
1)( sqyqq
qq
L HLH
HL
+−−=Π    for the low-quality firm.   (9b) 
The expected poaching profits are 
( )222 )(9
1)(~ sqyqq
q
L HLH
H
+−=Π
  
for the high-quality poacher,   (9c) 
( )222 )(9
1)(~ sqyqq
q
H LLH
L
+−−=Π   for the low-quality poacher.   (9d) 
 
 In line with the standard literature on vertical differentiation (see, Shaked and Sutton 
(1982), (1983)), the high-quality producer enjoys a competitive advantage and correspondingly 
higher incumbency and poaching profits. Incumbency profits, however, do not necessarily 
universally outweigh poaching profits. Poaching profits of the high-quality producer may exceed 
incumbency revenues of a low quality producer.  
It is worth observing already at this stage that the quality differential LH qq −=∆  favors 
the high-quality producer at the detriment of the low-quality producer, both for incumbency and 
for poaching revenues. Ultimately, as we will find out later on, this effect induces the low-quality 
producer to minimize the quality-gap to the high-quality producer. 
In general, an increase in the expected value or in the dispersion of the switching costs, as 
measured by s , tends to reduce the intensity of competition and therefore benefits both firms. A 
similar effect is characterized in the horizontal differentiation model designed by Gehrig and 
Stenbacka (2004). In the limiting case of identical quality provision only switching costs matter. 
In this case the incumbency revenues are double relative to the poaching revenues. 
 
b) Duopolistic Price Competition in Period 1  
 
We next proceed to analyze price competition in period 1. At this stage the competing firms 
rationally anticipate the period-2 equilibrium and internalize these effects into the decision 
making in period 1.  
In period 1, consumers do not yet know the realization of their switching costs. For that 
reason consumers with identical incomes will exhibit identical purchasing behavior in period 1. 
The consumers simply select the product that yields the highest discounted expected utility to 
them. They are indifferent between the products if  
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( ) =


 −−+−−+− ∫L
s
L
H
LL
L
L
L s
sdsryq
s
sspyqpyq
ˆ
0
21 )(
ˆ
)(δ  
 
( ) 


 −−+−−+− ∫H
s
H
L
HH
H
H
H s
sdsryq
s
sspyqpyq
ˆ
0
21 )(
ˆ
)(δ  .      (10) 
 
 Through re-arrangement of the indifference condition (10) we find that 
 


 −−−−−+∆+=
s
sspyq
s
sspyqypqpq LLLH
H
H
L
L
H
H
ˆ
)(
ˆ
)( 2211 δ  
[ ]



 −+−−−+ ∫ ∫L H
s s
LHL
L
HH
H
L dssqdssqs
sryqsryq
s
ˆ
0
ˆ
0
ˆ)(ˆ)( δδ  .     (11) 
 
From formulation (11) we can conclude that the customer is prepared to pay a premium for the 
high-quality product in period 1. This premium is higher the larger is the quality differential. This 
effect, which coincides with the insight from traditional models of vertical product 
differentiation, is captured by the second term in the right hand side of (11). The third term in the 
right hand side of (11) denotes the difference between the continuation utility within a customer 
relationship with the high-quality firm and that associated with the low-quality firm. This 
difference is positive and it adds to the premium for the high-quality product. The fourth term in 
the right hand side of (11) is negative. This captures that a period-1 customer of the high-quality 
firm will face less attractive poaching offers in period 2, and this effect reduces the quality 
premium in period 1. Finally, the last term in the right hand side of (11) adds to the quality 
premium, because it denotes the difference of the expected switching costs and from Proposition 
3.2 we know that this difference is positive. 
It should be emphasized that the quality premium described by (11) approaches the 
premium familiar from traditional models of vertical differentiation as the discount factor 
approaches zero, i.e. as the consumers become completely myopic. Consistent with this 
observation, the quality premium differs more significantly from the traditional one, the higher is 
the discount factor.  
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Firms maximize expected intertemporal profits. Let Hµ  denote the period-1 market share 
of the high-quality firm and Lµ  the market share of the low-quality firm. Then intertemporal 
profits consist of the period-1 profits and the discounted incumbency and poaching achieved in 
period 2. This is expressed formally as follows 
 
( )( ))(~1)( 221 LHp HHHHH Π−+Π+=Π µµδµ    (12a) 
( )( ))(~1)( 221 HLp LLLLL Π−+Π+=Π µµδµ  ,   (12b) 
where in addition it holds that HL µµ −= 1 . 
From (12a) and (12b) we can conclude that the intertemporal profits are linear as 
functions of the market shares acquired in period-1. Therefore, in period 1, the low-quality firm 
can offer introductory discounts up to a limit determined by the return on a captive period-1 
client. At this discount the low-quality firm breaks even. The high-quality firm just needs to 
match this price using the indifference relation (10) (or equivalently, (11)) and at that price the 
high-quality firm can still make a positive intertemporal profit on captive clients. Thus, in 
equilibrium, the high-quality firm will attract all consumers in period 1. The low-quality firm can 
only hope to poach consumers with low switching costs in period 2. 
 
Proposition 3.4 (Period-1 Prices)   Equilibrium prices in period 1 are given by 
( )( ))(~ 221 HLpL Π−Π−= δ  
and  


 −−−−−+∆+=
s
sspyq
s
sspyq
qq
yp
q
qp LLLH
H
H
HH
L
H
LH ˆ)(
ˆ
)( 2211
δ  
[ ]



 −+−−−+ ∫ ∫L H
s s
LH
H
L
L
HH
H
L
H
dssqdssq
qs
sryqsryq
qs
ˆ
0
ˆ
0
ˆ)(ˆ)( δδ . 
At this price equilibrium the high-quality firm captures the whole market in period 1.  
 
 Taken together Propositions 3.1 and 3.4 show that the equilibrium prices exhibit a 
systematic intertemporal structure: a phase of introductory offers with price discounts is 
succeeded by a phase where the firms exploit locked-in customers, with whom the customer 
relationship was formed in the first phase. Such an intertemporal pricing structure is typical for 
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models with switching costs (see, for example, the survey models of Klemperer (1995), Varian 
(2003), Farrell and Klemperer (2004)) or the general analysis of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and 
Taylor (2003)). In our model, the introductory discount of the high-quality firm is just sufficient 
to deny the low-quality firm any positive market share in period 1. In period 2 the high-quality 
firm can exploit its incumbency advantage, even though the low-quality firm may successfully 
poach some of its clients. Based on this line of arguments we can conclude that the intertemporal 
discounted profit of the low-quality firm is determined by the discounted value of the poaching 
profits in period 2. We formulate these insights in a more formal way in the next Proposition.  
 
Proposition 3.5 (Intertemporal profits)  
(a)  If y
q
qs
L
H )1( −≥   and LH qq >  the intertemporal discounted profit of the low-quality firm 
is ( )222 )(9)(
~ sqyqq
q
H LLH
L
L +−−=Π=Π δδ . 
(b)  If y
q
qs
L
H )1( −< and LH qq >  the low-quality firm is not active and its intertemporal 
discounted profit is 0=Π L . 
(c)  The intertemporal discounted profit of the high-quality firm is always positive and it 
exceeds that of the low-quality firm. 
(d)  If 0=∆ , i.e. if the duopolists offer identical qualities, the intertemporal profit for both 
firms is 22 9
)(~ sji δδ =Π=Π , for { }LHji ,, ∈ , ji ≠ . 
 
Proposition 3.5 (d) reports a particularly striking finding as it highlights the divergence of our 
results from the standard literature on product differentiation. In the presence of differentiated 
switching costs the equilibrium profits are positive even when the competing firms offer identical 
product characteristics. In our setting with competing duopolists each firm is a monopolist on the 
poaching revenues associated with those consumers who have a customer relationship with the 
rival. For that reason it is profitable to poach the competitor in period 2 even when there is so 
harsh ex-ante competition for market shares that all profits, which are related to market shares 
acquired in period 1, are effectively eliminated through the introductory discount at the stage 
when the firms compete for the formation of customer relationships. Hence, the intertemporal 
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discounted profits are strictly positive despite identical product choices by the firms. This result, 
however, will not survive the entry of additional equal quality competitors, as Section 6 
demonstrates. 
 On the basis of the present analysis on might also be tempted to enquire about the 
dynamics of the poaching process in a more general structure with several rounds of competition. 
What would be the ultimate distribution of prices? On the basis of our analysis we would 
conjecture that the answer should depend on the type of information about the history of 
purchases available to the competitors. If firms can only observe current consumer attachment, 
and if they have no records about past purchasing behavior, the steady state actually coincides 
with our period-2 prices. If firms keep more detailed records about past purchasing behavior, 
further possibilities to segment the market will arise and be exploited in equilibrium. 
 
4.  Quality Competition  
 
We continue to focus on a duopolistic industry where the competing firms can produce different 
qualities or an identical quality. The quality decision serves as a long-run commitment relative to 
the subsequent stage of price competition. We assume the available range of qualities to be given 
by the interval [ ]ωυ , , where )(υω  denotes the highest (lowest) available quality ( 0>υ ). 
Suppose, for the purpose of analyzing the strategic incentives for quality provision as opposed to 
quality decisions determined by cost considerations, that the establishment of a production line of 
quality q imposes “low” costs, which are independent of the quality.  
 Suppose that the duopolistic firms operate with different quality levels so that the high-
quality firm produces Hq , whereas the low-quality firm produces Lq . As we have shown in the 
previous section, in period 1 the high-quality firm captures all the market and the intertemporal 
discounted equilibrium profits of the low-quality firm are given by its discounted poaching profits 
in period 2, ( )222 )(9)(
~ sqyqq
q
H LLH
L
+−−=Π δδ  (see (9.d)). These poaching profits are 
strictly decreasing as a function of the quality produced by the high-quality producer, Hq , and 
strictly increasing as a function of the firm’s own quality, Lq . Thus, the low-quality firm always 
has an incentive to increase its quality Lq  until it approaches the high quality level Hq . Likewise, 
the profit of the high-quality firm is increasing in Hq . Consequently, we can characterize the 
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equilibrium configuration with respect to the quality commitments according to the next 
proposition.  
 
Proposition 4.1 (Quality Agglomeration) 
In the absence of costs of quality provision the subgame perfect quality equilibrium is 
characterized by quality agglomeration whereby both firms offer the highest available quality 
ω== HL qq .  
 
 This result is in stark contrast to the literature on vertical product differentiation based on 
income heterogeneity (e.g. Shaked and Sutton (1982), (1983) and Andersen, de Palma and Thisse 
(1992)). While that literature predicts local monopolies, in our theory more than one firm can 
profitably operate with identical qualities.  In our theory, when markets are sufficiently large, or 
alternatively when sunk costs of entry are sufficiently small, at least two firms will enter at the 
top. As we will subsequently see, there will be exactly two providers of top quality.  
 We have seen that higher switching costs will stimulate poaching profits.7 Within the 
framework of our model increased poaching profits will make entry more attractive even at 
identical qualities. This, in turn, will promote competition in the vertically differentiated industry. 
In this respect higher switching costs tend to make the industry more competitive from the point 
of view of a long-term perspective with free entry. This prediction is opposite to the common 
view according to which higher switching costs would increase the market power of incumbent 
firms. Clearly, this popular view is restricted to a short-term perspective with already established 
customer relationships and with a given market structure.  
 One might be tempted to ask to what extent our findings are driven by the ability of firms 
to price discriminate rather than by the presence of switching costs. In fact it turns out that even 
under uniform pricing we get the same result of quality agglomeration at the top. The reasoning is 
rather straightforward. As the analysis in section 3 reveals, with distinct qualities in equilibrium 
the high quality firm attracts all the customers in period 1 and hence applies a defensive 
incumbent strategy in period 2 while the low quality firm only engages in poaching in period 2. 
                                                          
7 The presence of price discrimination and thereby the existence of positive poaching profits is a crucial feature for 
the emergence of the subgame perfect equilibrium with agglomeration at the top quality. In the absence of price 
discrimination, i.e. in a symmetric benchmark model with uniform period-2 prices like in the influential model by 
Klemperer (1987), competition for the formation of relationships would eliminate any positive profits associated with 
the identical qualities. Furthermore, uniform period-2 prices might lead to price configurations with mixed strategy 
equilibria.    
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According to Proposition 3.3, this implies that the poaching firm tries to shift quality upwards to 
the level of the high quality firm. If both firms offer identical (top) quality, however, we need to 
analyze a different pricing game with uniform prices. Relying on the findings of Chen (1997) we 
can confirm that agglomeration at the top is the unique quality constellation in equilibrium also 
without price discrimination. 
 
Proposition 4.2 (Quality Agglomeration under Non-Discriminatory Pricing) 
In the absence of costs of quality provision the subgame perfect quality equilibrium is 
characterized by quality agglomeration whereby both firms offer the highest available quality 
ω== HL qq , even when firms are restricted to non-discriminatory pricing. 
 
Proof:  For LH qq >  the analysis of section 3 applies. According to Proposition 3.4 in equilibrium 
firm H acquires all customers in period 1 and firm L is restricted to poaching in period 2. Hence, 
firm H applies 2Hp  and firm L applies 
2
Lr  as defined in equations (7) in period 2. Equilibrium 
period 1 prices are defined in Proposition 3.4. Hence, according to Proposition 3.3 firm L prefers 
higher qualities to lower ones. 
 For  LH qq =  Chen (1997) establishes in Proposition 8 that equilibrium profits under 
uniform pricing exceed those under discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, at the stage of quality 
selection the L-firm always want to match – if not exceed – the H-quality. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Even though in the absence of price discrimination poaching cannot occur directly, poaching 
concerns do affect pricing incentives even under uniform prices. However, with uniform prices 
the poaching incentives gets convoluted with the incentive to protect captive consumers. 
 
 
5. Duopoly Competition with Income and Switching Cost Differentiation 
 
In order to render our results comparable to the literature on quality differentiation based on 
income heterogeneity alone we generalize the basic model and introduce income differentiation 
in addition to the differentiation in switching costs. Will agglomeration at the top quality also 
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hold if the seminal analysis of Shaked and Sutton (1982) is extended to incorporate switching 
cost differentiation in addition to income differentiation? 
 Assume that the consumers are represented by their combination of switching cost and 
income (s,y). The consumers (s,y) are assumed to be uniformly distributed on [ ] [ ]yys ,,0 ×  with 
the reasonable feature that ys < .8 This captures the idea that the maximal switching cost of a 
consumer never exceeds the available income of this consumer. As a starting point we also 
assume that the duopolistic firms operate with different quality levels so that the high-quality firm 
produces Hq , whereas the low-quality firm produces Lq .  
In light of our findings in Section 3 (in particular Proposition 3.4) we can start the analysis 
with the case in which the high quality firms succeeds in attracting all customers in period 1. 
Thus, the low quality firm can only engage in poaching in period 2. This situation is illustrated 
graphically in Figure 1.The critical consumers are just indifferent between staying with the high-
quality firm and paying price Hp2 , and switching to the lower-quality product and paying the 
poaching price Hr . Formally, the location of these indifferent consumers is captured by the line 
  y
q
qqrp
q
qs
L
LHHH
L
H −−−= 2  .     (13) 
As indicated in Figure 1, consumers located below this line switch, whereas consumers above this 
line remain within the established customer relationship. Formally, Figure 1 captures the 
configuration with ).( yy
q
qqs
L
LH −−> 9 
 Let us proceed by determining the price equilibrium for this configuration. As can be seen 
from Figure 1, the area of switching consumers is given by )()(
2
1
21 yyss −+ , where 1s and 
2s are determined by  
  y
q
qqrp
q
qs
L
LHHH
L
H −−−= 21      (14a) 
and  
                                                          
8 The literature reports fairly few attemtps to analyze multi-dimensional product differentiation. Important exceptions 
are Irmen and Thisse (1998) for an analysis of competition in general multi-characteristics spaces and Ireland (1987) 
(Chapter 7) for a combination of horizonal and vertical product differentiation.  
9 This condition guarantees that the line (13) intersects below s at yy =  and above 0 at yy = .  
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  y
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q
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L
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L
H −−−= 22  .     (14b) 
 
Thus, the number of switching consumers is given by 
 
  ( )yyyy
q
qqrp
q
q
L
LHHH
L
H −

 +−−−
22
 ,    (15) 
 
whereas the number of loyal consumers is  
   ( )yyyy
q
qqrp
q
qs
L
LHHH
L
H −

 +−++−
22
 .   (16) 
 
 In light of (15) and (16) the period-2 price charged to existing clients and the period-2 
poaching price are determined by the firms’optimization problems 
 
( )yyyy
q
qqrp
q
qsp
L
LHHH
L
HH
p H −

 +−++−
2
max 22
2
 (17a) 
and 
( )yyyy
q
qqrp
q
qr
L
LHHH
L
HH
r H −

 +−−−
2
max 2   .  (17b) 
 
When  ( )yy
q
qqs
L
LH −−>   both optimization problems generate interior solutions with 
the following incumbency and poaching prices: 
 
 


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2
2
3
1
2 yyq
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q
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H
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H
H       (18a) 
and  
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 Comparing these equilibrium prices with those characterized by (7a) and (7b) we can 
observe that individual income is substituted by average income. Furthermore, one verifies 
readily that 
 
 0
)(3
)(
2
1
2
2 >
++−
=∂
∂
H
L
H
H
q
qyys
q
p   if  
yy
sqL +>
2  
and  
 0
)(3
)(
2
1
2 >
++−
=∂
∂
L
H
L
H
q
qyys
q
r  if  
yy
sqH +>
2  . 
 
Consequently, the incumbency price of the high-quality firm and the poaching price of the 
low-quality firm are always increasing functions of the qualities for sufficiently high levels of 
quality.  
Substituting the equilibrium prices (18a) and (18b) back into the profit functions (17a) and 
(17b) establishes incumbency profits as 
 
 [ ] )()( 22 yyrspH HH −−=Π      (19a) 
and  
 ( ) )()(~ 22 yyrH H −=Π   ,     (19b) 
 
respectively. In particular, as the poaching price Hr is strictly increasing as a function of Lq  we 
can conclude that the poaching profit (19b) is a strictly increasing function of Lq . This implies 
that each competitor has an incentive to provide the highest quality. Since, due to switching costs 
and poaching, both competitors can earn positive revenues even when they offer identical 
products, in equilibrium they will both offer top quality. In addition, the poaching profit (19b) is a 
strictly increasing function of s . 
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Proposition 5.1 (Minimal Quality Differentiation)  
Let  )( yys −−> ν
νω  and 
yy
s
+>
2ν . Then in duopoly the subgame perfect equilibrium 
exhibits agglomeration at the highest quality level.  
 
Proposition 5.1 confirms that our central theme “two at the top” also applies to an 
economic environment that closely resembles Shaked and Sutton (1982) with the added feature of 
switching cost differentiation. The equilibrium property, however, is in stark contrast to the 
traditional literature on vertical product differentiation, which – in the absence of switching costs 
- predicts configurations, where the oligopolists always engage in quality differentiation as a 
strategic device to relax competition (see, Shaked and Sutton (1982) or Chapter 8 in Anderson, de 
Palma and Thisse (1992)). Within the framework of our model the incentive to relax competition 
is outperformed by the incentive to profit from poaching. In equilibrium, the low-quality producer 
always tries to minimise the distance to the high quality producer10, thereby generating an 
equilibrium configuration with minimum quality differentiation.    
 Our agglomeration result qualitatively reminds of the principle of minimum 
differentiation established by de Palma, Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou and Thisse (1985) and Gehrig 
(1998). These authors consider an environment of a traditional Hotelling model equipped with an 
added dimension of taste heterogeneity such that firms cannot determine the purchasing behavior 
of an individual consumer. By applying a probabilistic discrete choice model or a search 
characteristic they establish product clustering as the subgame perfect product choice as long as 
the unobservable taste heterogeneity of consumers or the agglomeration economy is sufficiently 
strong. In our model sufficiently differentiated switching costs generate the agglomeration of 
qualities. Thus, contrary to these static contributions, here we focus on vertical product 
differentiation in a dynamic context, not horizontal product differentiation. Accordingly, the 
underlying economic mechanism is very different. Within the framework of our model the 
incentive to relax competition is dominated by the incentive to profit from poaching. In contrast, 
in de Palma, Ginsburgh, Papageorgiou and Thisse (1985) the price reduction induced by product 
agglomeration is dominated by the advantage of a higher market share associated with a location 
                                                          
10  Obviously the high-quality producer always prefers to maintain differentiation relative to the low-quality 
producer. 
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in the center of the Hotelling line when the non-spatial dimension associated with taste 
heterogeneity is sufficiently strong. 
  
 
6. Some Implications for Industrial Structure and Welfare 
 
By opening up a potential for poaching revenues, switching costs tend to invite entry at the top of 
the available quality spectrum. Of course, this begs the question, whether even more than two 
firms might enter at the top. However such a possibility can be readily discarded. As Taylor 
(2003) has shown in a general context, poaching revenues will be eliminated under such 
circumstances. With three identical competitors there will always exist two identical competitors 
for each poaching segment. Such a configuration generates Bertrand competition with respect to 
poaching. Hence, for any captive clientele there are two identical poachers driving down 
poaching rents and ultimately eliminating the poaching revenues.  
 Accordingly, applied to our context at most two firms, which offer a higher quality than 
all their competitors, can survive and earn positive revenues. A similar argument also applies to 
each lower level of quality provided in equilibrium, since again in equilibrium there cannot be 
two poachers with identical characteristics in the same market segments.  
 
Proposition 6.1 (Two at the Top) 
In any equilibrium each quality level is provided by at most two firms. In particular, at most two 
firms offer the highest quality. 
 
 In contrast to the standard literature on vertical product differentiation, in equilibrium each 
quality level can be provided by more than one firm in the presence of consumer switching costs. 
However, there cannot be more than two firms active on each quality level, because otherwise 
any poaching revenues would be eliminated. So what are the implications for the overall 
industrial structure in markets with consumer switching costs? Will the finiteness property 
survive the introduction of switching costs? Will the industry with switching costs remain a 
natural oligopoly?  
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 In order to answer this question we have to introduce a sunk cost of entry. Since we are 
particularly interested in large mature markets, we might as well assume that the sunk cost is 
relatively small (but positive).  
Proposition 6.1 implies that now in any free entry equilibrium of a large market there will 
be exactly two firms offering top quality.  Moreover, based on the analysis of section 3 we realize 
that due to the introductory offers in period 1 the top qualities are sold at such attractive discounts 
that in period 1 only the two top quality providers will attract positive market shares. All other 
firms that might potentially enter necessarily have to specialize on poaching activities. But even 
in period 2 the top quality providers enjoy a significant competitive advantage.  
 
Proposition 6.2 (Natural Oligopoly): 
In equilibrium, the joint market share of the two top quality incumbents exceeds 50% of the 
captive clients for any number of active firms. Hence, in equilibrium the two top quality providers 
always control more than half of the market, for any number of (lower quality) competitors. 
 
 
Proof: The number of loyal customers is determined by (16) for given period-2 prices. The 
incumbent’s reaction function reads 


 +−++=
22
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2
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q
qqrsp
q
q
L
LHHH
L
H . Substituting this into 
(16) we find that for any constellation of prices and poacher qualities the market share of loyal 
customers is at least 50%, since 
 
( ) ( )yysyyyy
q
qqr
yy
q
qqrss
L
LHH
L
LHH −>−


 +−++

 +−++−
2222
1  
 
Thus even the most competitive poaching sector cannot acquire more than 50% market share.  
Q.E.D. 
 
Our model presents a very specific version of the finiteness property. In any equilibrium 
industrial structure the two top firms dominate the market and secure at least half of the sales. 
While in general, we cannot rule out the entry of an increasing number of poachers as sunk costs 
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of entry diminish, the degree of competitiveness as well as industry profits are largely determined 
by the two top quality providers. Consequently, our industry exhibits all the essential properties 
of a natural oligopoly in the sense of Shaked and Sutton (1983). Hence, switching costs change 
the qualitative nature of markets with quality differentiation, since they invite a race to the top. 
On the other hand, the central prediction that endogenous sunk costs tend to generate natural 
oligopolies remains valid even in the presence of switching costs.  
 The equilibrium configuration characterized above seems to be consistent with the 
empirically observed industrial structure of the public accounting firms in the US. As the United 
States General Accounting Office’s report to a Senate committee (2003) makes clear, the 
accounting and audit services industry has a structure with two dominant accounting firms when 
the client firms are classified according to their industrial sector. In fact, for the different 
industrial sectors scrutinized by the report the two dominant accounting firms have a joint market 
share in the range between 70 % and 95 %. 
 From Proposition 3.2 we can directly conclude that the welfare loss induced by switching 
costs is independent of the quality level in all symmetric equilibria where firms supply identical 
qualities, because under such circumstances one third of the customers switch. Furthermore, this 
welfare loss is proportional to the dispersion of switching costs. In this respect our model predicts 
a negative relationship between switching costs and welfare. Furthermore, from Proposition 3.1 
we can conclude that the poaching prices are increasing as functions of the dispersion of the 
switching costs in equilibria with identical qualities.11  
 Our model implies that industries with switching costs will provide higher average quality 
than firms without. These industries are remarkably competitive when price discrimination, and, 
hence, poaching is allowed. However, if (positive) sunk investment are required for quality 
production, obviously several welfare concerns arise. First, equilibrium switching always entails 
a welfare cost to consumers. Second, agglomeration implies excessive investments at the same 
quality level.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
In this study we have established that quality choice is importantly affected by switching costs. In 
particular, in vertically differentiated markets where switching cost heterogeneity is sufficiently 
significant, we have demonstrated that low-quality producers have a particularly strong incentive 
to close the quality gap to high quality producers despite the bite of price competition. Under 
such circumstances the equilibrium configuration will be characterized by an agglomeration of 
two firms at the top of the quality spectrum. In this sense our result differs strongly from standard 
vertical differentiation models, where the degree of differentiation is always strictly positive. In 
our model the incentives created by poaching profits dominate relative to the competition-
relaxing effects of quality differentiation. This holds true as long as the poaching profits survive 
in equilibrium, i.e. as long as no more than two firms produce the top quality. Our results do not 
invalidate the finiteness property found in models of vertical product differentiation, since entry 
is limited by the profitability of poaching revenues. In particular, our theory predicts that there 
will never be more than two firms at the top of the quality spectrum. Furthermore, we found that 
the two top quality providers always control more than half of the market, for any number of 
(lower quality) competitors. 
Our results differ from the standard literature in three major aspects. First, and most 
importantly, our model shows that quality choice in models of vertical product differentiation 
typically also depends on aspects of the market environment other than income, such as switching 
costs. Abstracting from such features is not innocuous for the analysis of the degree of 
differentiation. However, the central result of the finiteness property is robust with respect to the 
introduction of switching costs. Our theory clearly predicts very concentrated market structures in 
large markets with two dominant firms and potentially a competitive fringe, which survives based 
on poaching profits.  
Secondly, our theory contributes to the literature on switching costs. In our model 
minimum quality differentiation occurs if switching cost heterogeneity is sufficiently significant. 
Strictly speaking this is a consequence of our assumption that the quality choices do not affect the 
magnitude of the switching costs. If switching costs are affected by product distance, Gehrig and 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
11 Of course, in our model where each consumer purchases precisely one unit of the product the price effect 
represents nothing but a transfer between the consumers and the producers with no impact on total welfare.     
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Stenbacka (2004) show that an additional effect on location has to be taken into account. Firms 
prefer distance because it is a means of increasing switching costs, and hence poaching profits. 
Thirdly, we have demonstrated that our model can be generalized to an environment 
where the consumers are differentiated in two dimensions: switching costs and incomes. 
Consequently, the quality agglomeration and the associated predictions regarding industry 
structure seem to be relevant for industries where the dimension of switching cost heterogeneity 
is sufficiently important. Many of the industries described in the introduction, perhaps, in 
particular, the accounting and audit industry, seem to fit this picture to a reasonable extent.    
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Figure 1: Poaching of consumers belonging to the market segment of the high-quality 
firm in period 1 with income and switching cost differentiation: the case with 
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